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Abstract 
China’s coalmining fatalities were 140 times higher than the U.S. in the last decade. 
To shed light on this issue, we form and examine a unique panel dataset of 25,387 
firm-year observations for China’s coalmining industry. We show that a firm’s 
leverage significantly determines its coalmining fatality: A 10% increase in the debt 
ratio leads, on average, to a 3% increase in the number of death tolls. It suggests that 
reducing leverage in coalmining firms can be an effective way to curb employee 
fatalities. Our study highlights the importance of corporate finance in helping solving 
social and institutional problems. 
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1. Introduction 
The annual coalmining fatalities in China were, on average, at 4,643 between 2000 
and 2011, which were 140 times higher than that of the U.S. for the same period,
1
 
despite the fact that China’s annual coal production was merely 2 times of the U.S.2 
At its peak, in 2003, the death rate per 100 tons of coal produced was 100 times 
higher than that of the U.S. and 30 times higher than South Africa.
3
 It is hard to 
reconcile this fact with the Chinese government’s continued efforts to improve the 
coalmining safety. For instance, in 2000, it set up a national surveillance system to 
keep a close eye on the safety conditions of coalmines; in 2001, it earmarked over 4 
billion yuan (over $480 million) to help both the state-owned and small private 
coalmines to improve safety.
4
 
 Studies in the past decade have been trying to uncover the causes for such a 
high fatality rate. Wright (2004) and Tu (2007) attribute the high death rate to the 
hiring of low quality workers in local town-owned mines. Wang (2006) points to the 
lack of effective monitoring at the state level. Jia and Nie (2013) argue that collusion 
between local government and coalmining firms is responsible for it. Fisman and 
Wang (2013) show that executives’ political connections significantly increase 
workplace fatalities.
5
 While these studies shed important light on the causes of 
coalmining fatalities, they are confined to case, small sample, or provincial-level 
                                                          
1
China’s data is obtained from the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) website: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn. The U.S. data is obtained from the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) website: http://www.msha.gov 
2
BP Statistics Review of World Energy 2013, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-
bp/statistical-review-of-world-energy-2013/statistical-review 
3
“Coal mining: Most deadly job in China,” China Daily, November 13, 2004. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/13/content_391242.htm 
4
 Ibid.  
5
Fisman and Wang (2013) provide a comprehensive discussion on workplace safety oversight in 
China. 
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(rather than firm-level) studies.
6
 Most of them, except Fisman and Wang (2013), are 
focusing mainly on the regulatory environment and industrial features, which 
overlooks the potentially important firm-level characteristics. Our study aims to fill 
this gap.  
Myers (1977) argues that a firm with high leverage has incentives to pass up 
valuable investment opportunities. Thus, if a firm’s investment in its employee is a 
positive NPV project, the firm is likely to underinvest in employee benefits given its 
high leverage, resulting in a negative relation between leverage and employee benefits 
(Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011). Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show that if firms 
want to credibly commit themselves to providing better employee benefits, they need 
to have lower debt ratios than firms that do not implement employee friendly policies. 
Hanka (1998) finds that high leverage is associated with more frequent employment 
reductions, lower wages and reduced pension. Recently, Bae, Kang, and Wang (2011) 
find that firms that treat their employees fairly maintain low debt ratios.
7
 In the spirit 
of above studies, we posit that a coalmining firm’s leverage is likely to be related to 
its employee fatality. 
To conduct this investigation, we hand collect coalmining accidents/deaths data 
from the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) and the State Administration 
of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS). We then merge it with the Chinese Industrial 
Enterprise Database (CIED) to obtain the firm-level data for coalmining firms. We 
create a unique panel dataset of 25,387 firm-year observations for 2001-2006. Our 
                                                          
6
 One of the main limitations of provincial-level studies is that it is unable to control for the cross-
sectional variations of firm characteristics within the same province. 
7
 In addition, the literature on trade unions shows that, due to bankruptcy risk, a firm can improve 
its bargaining power with the trade union on negotiating workers’ wages when the firm chooses to 
use more debt in its capital structure, suggesting a negative relation between leverage and 
employee benefits. See, for example, Bronars and Deere (1991), Perotti and Spier (1993), and 
Matsa (2010).  
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key finding is that a firm’s leverage (debt-to-asset ratio) significantly determines its 
coalmining fatality.  
Using multiple regression analysis, we first identify a positive relation between 
leverage and coalmining death, which is robust to the use of alternative variables and 
subsample analysis. After showing that high leverage is related to high death toll, we 
investigate whether high leverage causes high fatality rather than the other way 
around. Since one may argue that it is the high death tolls that force the firm to 
borrow excessively to meet the employee compensations, government fines, and other 
associated costs. We show that the reverse causality is unlikely to hold for China 
coalmining firms. 
Another concern is that some unobservable firm characteristics could be 
responsible for both the level of the firm’s leverage and its number of fatalities. We 
use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression method to address this potential 
endogeneity problem. Our results hold up to this test.  
One may also argue that this year’s coalmining fatality could be affected by the 
death toll of last year. To address this issue, we control for the number of death of last 
year and use the system GMM (generalized method of moments) regression method 
which is most suitable for examining dynamic panel data. The GMM regression 
results are consistent with our main findings.  
Although our evidence shows that leverage significantly determines coalmining 
fatalities, this result can still be attributed to the use of inappropriate estimation 
methods. Our dependent variable, the number of coalmining death, is nonnegative and 
takes only on relatively few values including zero, known as the count variable. It 
does not follow a normal distribution as that is for continuous variables that can take 
on a large range of values. This violates the standard distributional assumption for 
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liner regression. Since the nominal distribution for count data is the Poisson 
distribution, we run Poisson regressions to check the robustness of our results. Our 
key finding holds at the 1% significance level. Further, the economic meaning of the 
regression is straightforward: A 10% increase in the debt ratio leads, on average, to a 
3% increase in the number of death tolls. 
While debt serves as an effective disciplinary/control mechanism that reduces 
the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), our evidence suggest that high 
leverage is not suitable to China’s coalmining industry. Our finding is, nonetheless, 
not inconsistent with Jensen’s theory, since Jensen (1986) posits that the disciplinary 
benefits of debt is mostly gained by firms with activities that generate “substantial 
economic rents” and hence substantial amounts of free cash flow. Our data show that 
the coalmining firms are, on average, not the very profitable ones with a mean annual 
profitability rate of 6.6% (median = 6.4%), which is partly due to the tight coal price 
control by the central government.
8
 
Overall, our study lays a micro foundation to the analysis of coalmining fatality. 
We show that, from a corporate finance perspective, a seemingly institutional failure 
could have its micro root. A more suitable capital structure strategy (a low leverage in 
our case) can be an effective tool in easing the number of death tolls. Our study, 
therefore, highlights the importance of corporate finance in helping solving social and 
institutional problems. Our study also paves the way for more corporate finance based 
analyses in workplace accidents and fatalities.  
                                                          
8
 Chinese coalmining firms, since 1996, had to sell a certain amount of coals to domestic power 
generators at a tightly regulated below-market price, since the Chinese government had tried to 
ensure power supply and smooth energy prices. This policy was, however, abolished by the 
government in 2013. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-12/26/content_16055107.htm. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and 
describes the sample statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical results and conducts 
various robustness tests. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1. The Sample 
The data on coalmining accidents and fatalities are hand collected from the State 
Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) and the State Administration of Coal Mine 
Safety (SACMS). From 2001, the SAWS and SACMS publish coalmining accidents 
news bulletin on their official websites,
9
 which includes the date of the coalmining 
accident, the name of the firm involving an accident, the number of death tolls for 
each accident, and the total casualty numbers for each accident (the number of deaths 
plus the number of people injured and missing). We hand collect above information 
for each coalmining firm across all the provinces for the period 2001-2006. Our 
sample starts from 2001 because the SACMS only started to publish coalmining 
accidents data from July 2000 and the SAWS was officially formed on 2001. We end 
our sample at 2006, since SAWS and SACMS only publish data on accidents 
involving more than 3 casualties from 2007. 
We obtain all the firm information and financial data from the Chinese 
Industrial Enterprise Database (CIED),
10
 which is constructed by the National Bureau 
                                                          
9
 The State Law requires the coalmining firms to report to their provincial governments and the 
relevant departments of the state council immediately following the coalmining accidents. 
Delayed reporting or underreporting are subject to administrative penalties and criminal charges. 
See Article 92 of “The Production Safety Law” issued in 2002.  
10
 The CIED contains 130 firm-level data items. It is also called China Annual Survey of 
Industrial Firms or China Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms by some studies. For recent 
studies which use this database, see, for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009). 
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of Statistics and is the largest database for Chinese industrial firms.
11
 The CIED 
covers all state-owned and sizable non-state-owned enterprises,
12
 which accounts for 
90% of the total sales of all industrial firms in China.
13
 The CIED database with its 
complete information is, however, only available for 1998-2007.
14
 This is another 
reason why we end our sample at 2006. We take all the coalmining firm data from 
CIED and merge it with the coalmining accidents data hand collected from SAWS 
and SACMS. We manage to form a panel dataset of 25,387 firm-year observations 
which includes all state-owned and sizable non-state-owned coalmining firms for the 
period 2001-2006. 
We also collect some provincial-level data which we believe are important to 
our analysis. The GDP per capita for each province is collected from China Statistical 
Yearbook. The measure of the level of corruption for each province is recorded in 
China Procuratorial Yearbook. The number of total circulation of media newspapers 
is obtained from China Statistical Data of Press and Publication. 
Table 1 presents the annual distribution of coalmining accidents/fatalities for 
2001-2006. It shows that the number of coalmining firms increased year on year. The 
number of firms in 2006 (6,463) was nearly 3 times higher than that of 2001 (2,549). 
The number of firms with coalmining accidents also increased year on year except for 
2006. The number of accidents reached over 400 per year during 2003-2005 
accompanied with a sharp decline in 2006 (90 accidents). The number of fatalities 
since 2001 doubled every year and peaked at 2003 (863 deaths); it then fell by over 10% 
                                                          
11
 The CIED contains over 2 million observations for the period 1998-2007. The number of firms 
stands at 160,000 in 1998 and increases year on year and reaches 330,000 in 2007.  
12
 The sizable non-state-owned enterprise refers to firms with annual sales of no less than 5 
million yuan. 
13
 In the first national economic survey conducted in 2004, the total sales for all industrial firms 
were at 218 billion yuan, while the total sales for all CIED firms were at 196 billion yuan. 
14
 Some key data items (e.g., registration ID, equity capital, subsidy）are missing from CIED after 
2007 which prevents us matching the post-2007 data with the earlier observations between 2001 
and 2006. 
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per year and dropped to 316 in 2006. The death toll per accident shows that it was 
around 2 deaths per accident (except for 2006) despite the variations in other 
indicators. Though we have seen many improvements in 2006, it was the worst year 
in terms of death per accident (at 3.5). This indicates that it is no easy task to deal 
with the fatality problem in the coalmining industry. Overall, there are 1,155 firms 
involved with 1,725 accidents and 3,267 deaths averaging 1.9 deaths per accident.  
[Table 1] 
2.2. Main Variables 
We first define all the main variables used in this study which are constructed at the 
annual frequency.
15
 The main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (one plus) 
the number of coalmining deaths per firm per year. Our main variable of interest is the 
firm’s debt ratio which is measured as the firm’s total debt divided by its total asset. 
We observe a positive relation between debt ratio and employee death at the 1% 
significance level (Appendix Table A.2). We posit that a firm’s leverage significantly 
determines the number of coalmining deaths. 
Other firm-level explanatory variables are classified into three groups. The first 
group, in addition to the debt ratio, contains other financial indicators (i.e., burdens 
and benefits). The tax rate is the total amount of taxes actually paid by a firm divided 
by its total sales. The subsidy rate is the total amount of government subsidies 
received divided by the total sales. The second group controls for firm-specific 
characteristics. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total asset. Age is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years starting from the formation of the firm. 
Profitability rate is measured as the operating profit divided by the total sales. 
Investment in fixed asset is defined as the total investment in fixed asset divided by 
                                                          
15
 Definitions for all the variables used in this study are provided in Appendix Table A.1. 
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the total asset, which captures firm’s investment in advanced technology, equipment, 
and infrastructure.
16
The third group controls for the equity ownership. State 
ownership is the percentage equity ownership by the state. Individual ownership is the 
total equity ownership by the collective individual investors. 
In addition to the firm-level measures, we also construct three provincial-level 
variables to control for the variations across different provinces. GDP per capita is the 
natural logarithm of average GDP per capita for each province. Corruption is 
measured as the corruption cases filed per 10,000 government officials in that 
province, similar to Fisman and Gatti (2002), Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003), and 
Glaeser and Saks (2006). Media exposure is the per capita print of newspapers, as in 
Besley and Burgess (2002), Nie, Jiang, and Wang (2013). Large circulation of 
newspapers facilitates the flow of information especially the bad ones like coalmining 
death. Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009) argue that media can play a significant role 
even in an authoritarian system since it helps the government to monitor the 
behaviour of bureaucratic officials. Finally, we adjust all the relevant variables at the 
2001 price by using various price indices obtained from China Statistical Yearbook. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for above variables. The average debt 
ratio is 53.4% (median = 51.9%) with a standard deviation of 0.36. The debt ratio is 
28.2% for the 25
th
 percentile while it reaches 75.0% for the 75
th
 percentile.
17
 The 
average effective tax rate is 9.4% with a standard deviation of 0.06, which suggests 
                                                          
16
 According to the National Bureau of Statistics, “Investment in fixed assets is the essential 
means for social reproduction of fixed assets. By means of construction and purchase of fixed 
assets, more advanced technologies and equipment are adopted in the national economy, and new 
sectors are established, which promote the adjustment of economic structure and the regional 
distribution of productive forces and enhance the economic strengths so as to provide the material 
conditions for improving people’s livelihood.” 
17
 There are in total 548 observations (2.16% of the sample) have zero leverage. 
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that coalmining firms are not in fact heavily burdened by taxes.
18
 The average subsidy 
received from the government is rather low at 0.7% of its total sales (standard 
deviation = 0.07). Even this figure is driven by relatively few firms with very large 
subsidy rates since the rate at the 75
th
 percentile is still at 0%. We take a closer look at 
the data and find that large state-owned coalmining firms receive most of the 
subsidies. Thus, subsidy rate could potentially capture a firm’s degree of connection 
with the government.  
[Table 2] 
The average size of coalmining firm is 159 million yuan (20 million U.S. 
dollars), which is larger than the average size of 85 million yuan for all the industrial 
firms recorded by CIED for the same period.
19
 The average firm is 15 years old with 
the oldest one at 58 years and youngest at 1 year old. Coalmining firms are, on 
average, not very profitable with an average operating profit to total sales at 6.6% 
(median = 6.4%). Investment in fixed assets is, on average, at 45.3% (median = 
44.4%). In terms of equity ownership, individual investors, on average, collectively 
own 34.7% of the firm compared to the 20.2% of state ownership. This is mainly 
because 80% of the sample firms are classified as non-state-owned firms by CIED.  
The provincial-level data shows that the average GDP per capita is 13,461 yuan, 
while a large disparity exists: the minimum is just 3,000 yuan and the maximum is 
58,837 yuan. The degree of corruption for each province is similar. There are, on 
average, 4.4 corruption cases filed for every 10,000 government officials, which 
reflect the prevalence of corruption in China. The level of media exposure (i.e., per 
                                                          
18
 Although the nominal tax rate in China is reasonably high, e.g., 25% for corporate income tax 
and 17% for value added tax (VAT), the effective tax rate is rather low thanks to many different 
kinds of tax rebate and weak enforcement on taxation.  
19
 The exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan (RMB) was around 1 dollar to 
8 yuan for our sample period (2001-2006). 
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capita print of newspapers in a year) is not even with a mean of 22.7 and a standard 
deviate of 19.2.  
Appendix Table A.2 presents the correlation matrix for the firm-level variables. 
As can be seen, leverage (our main variable of interest) is positively correlated with 
subsidy rate, firm size, age, and state ownership, while negatively correlated with 
profitability, investment in fixed assets, and individual ownership. It suggests that if a 
firm is large, old, receiving more subsidies from the government, or largely owned by 
the state, it is more likely to have a high leverage; while high leverage is likely to be 
associated with low profitability, low investment in fixed assets. 
Coalmining fatality (the dependent variable of our study) is significantly related 
to most of the explanatory variables. Specifically, it is positively related to leverage, 
subsidy rate, firm size, age, investment in fixed assets, and state ownership, while 
negatively correlated with tax rate and individual ownership. It would be interesting 
to see how many of these relations are still held in a multiple regression analysis, 
which is the focus for the rest of the study. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
In this section we perform multiple regression analyses in an attempt to establish the 
determinants of coalmining deaths. All regression estimates use robust standard errors 
clustered at the provincial level, which account for possible heteroskedasticity and 
within-province serial correlation of the idiosyncratic error terms. 
 
3.1. Baseline Regressions 
In Table 3, we report the results from our baseline regressions, which control for 
leverage and all the other explanatory variables discussed in the last section. The 
12 
 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of coalmining 
deaths per firm per year. Specification 1 runs simple OLS regression with leverage as 
the only explanatory variable. The coefficient estimate of debt ratio is 0.030 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level test, suggesting a positive relation between 
leverage and coalmining fatalities. This simple result survives after controlling for all 
the important explanatory variables and is robust to various regression techniques. 
[Table 3] 
In specification 2, we add all the firm-level explanatory variables into the 
regression as well as control for year and firm fixed effects. The coefficient estimate 
of debt ratio is positive and significant at the 5% level test. In addition, profitability 
rate is significantly positive at the 5% level, suggesting a rather unpleasant relation 
between profitability and coalmining fatality. The coefficient estimate of size is 
weakly significant.
20
 It is intuitive that the larger the firm the more workers it may 
employ and the more death tolls it may have. It contradicts, however, to the 
commonly held belief that coalmining deaths are mainly constrained to small firms 
where the safety standard has been kept to a sheer minimum.
21
 It also seems to 
suggest that the government’s efforts to increase the size of coalmining firms via 
merger and nationalization have yet to achieve its objective of reducing fatalities. 
Specification 3 adds further the provincial-level explanatory variables into the 
regression, the results mirror that of specification 2 that leverage, size and profitability 
significantly relates to the number of coalmining deaths. 
 
                                                          
20
 However, as can be seen from the rest of the tests, the size pattern is unstable across various 
tests, suggesting, at best, a loose relation between size and the number of employee death. 
21
 One potential reason for the significant positive relation between firm size and employee death 
is that we include only sizable coalmining firms in our sample: either state-owned firms or non-
state-owned firms with annual sales of no less than 5 million yuan. Statistics show that small (non-
sizable) coalmining firms typically owned by villages, however, have the highest employee death 
rate in China. http://news.163.com/41214/4/17IPC77C0001124T.html 
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3.2. Sub-sample regressions 
Table 4 specification 1 is the same as specification 3 in the last table apart from 
adding an interaction variable (debt ratio * key state firm). Key state firm refers to the 
94 largest state-owned coalmining firms named by the central government.
 
We 
construct a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is a key state firm and zero 
otherwise. We find similar results as in the Table 3, while the interaction variable is 
statistically insignificant.  
In specification 2, instead of using the debt ratio as the explanatory variable, we 
set a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s debt ratio is above the sample average 
and zero otherwise. We find that the coefficient estimate of high debt dummy is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level test. 
[Table 4] 
In specifications 3 and 4, we divide the sample into two subsamples based on 
whether the coalmining firm is a key state firm or not. Specification 3 shows the 
regression results for the key firm subsample. Since very limited firms are classified 
as the key state firm, we only have 478 firm-year observations for this regression. We 
find that none of the previous results hold for the key state firms but some interesting 
patterns emerge however.  
The coefficient estimate of subsidy rate is significantly positive at the 1% level 
test. The positive relation between subsidy and coalmining death is a challenge to the 
government which begs for a rethink on its subsidy policy to the key state firms. In 
unreported results, we find that the average subsidy rate for key state firms is 6.73%, 
while it is merely 0.55% for non-key firms. In addition, the coefficient estimate of 
corruption is significantly positive for key state firms while insignificant for non-key 
firms. Corruption seems to be a problem for coalmining death in key state firms. 
14 
 
In unreported results, we run tests for publicly listed firms. Since there are only 
24 coalmining firms listed on the stock market, it limits us to do any large scale tests 
on public coalmining firms in this study. Interestingly, 23 out of the 24 public firms 
are key state firms. Thus, the public sample is simply a subsample of key state firms. 
Again, it shows that key state firms enjoy an overwhelming advantage in listing in 
China’s tightly regulated IPO market. We run a same regression as specification 3 for 
the 24 public firms (146 firm-year observations). With little surprise, the key result is 
similar to that of specification 3 that leverage of public firms does not have a 
significant effect on the death toll. 
In specification 4, we run the same regression for the non-key firms. Since the 
sample observations are just slightly less than the full sample, the results mirror our 
main findings reported for the full sample, which suggests that the leverage effect is 
pronounced only for the non-key firms. 
Specifications 5 and 6 divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether 
a firm’s debt ratio is below or above the sample average. We obtain two subsamples 
with roughly equal number of observations. It shows that the leverage effect holds 
only for the high-debt subsample. Overall, specifications 2 and 5 suggest that high 
leverage is a significant issue for high coalmining fatality. 
 
3.3. Alternative variables 
We next use alternative explanatory and dependent variables to test the main results. 
Specifically, we have found in previous regressions that in addition to leverage, firm 
size and profitability significantly relates to coalmining fatalities. We thus use 
alternative measures of size and profitability to test the robustness of our results. For 
15 
 
the dependent variable, we use an alternative measure of employee death to test 
whether the leverage effect is robust to this change. 
In Table 5 specification 1, we use total sales, instead of the total assets, to proxy 
for firm size and use return on asset (ROA) to measure the profitability rate. In this 
new regression, our main variable debt ratio is the only significant variable though at 
a weaker significance level (P value = 0.071).
22
  
[Table 5] 
In the next two specifications, we use an alternative measure for employee 
fatality. According to the Chinese government, the severity levels for workplace 
accidents are classified as follows: accident with a fatality of 3 or less is defined as 
“general”, 3-9 as “relatively serious”, 10-29 as “very serious”, and 30+ as “extremely 
serious”. Based on this, we set a dummy variable ‘Death3’ as our new dependent 
variable, which equals one if an accident involving 3 or more deaths (i.e., relatively 
serious or more severe) and zero otherwise.
23
 Specification 2 use the original set of 
explanatory variables and specification 3 use the same set of variables as in 
specification 1.  It shows that leverage is statistically significant at the 5% level test 
for both specifications.
24
 
 
3.4. Reverse causality 
We have so far established a significant relation between firm’s debt ratio and the 
number of employee death. This seems to suggest that high debt burden leads to high 
                                                          
22
 In results unreported here, we use the total number of employees of a firm as an alternative 
proxy for firm size. While this new proxy for firm size is insignificant, our main variable debt 
ratio is still statistically significant (P value = 0.062). 
23
 Table 2 shows that the average death toll per accident for the full sample is about 2 people. 
24
 In results unreported here, instead of using the natural logarithm of the number of deaths, we 
use the natural logarithm of the death rate where death rate is defined as the number of death per 
firm per year divided by the firm’s total number of employees, and then times 1,000. We find that 
leverage significantly affects the death rate, though at a 10% significance level. 
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coalmining fatalities. However, endogeneity issues prevent us from drawing a 
conclusion that high debt ratio causes the high death toll. One form of the endogeneity 
problem is reverse causality. One may argue that it is the high death tolls that force 
the firm to borrow excessively to meet the employee compensations, government 
fines, and other associated costs. This can be true for many developed countries as 
compensation for employee’s life can be extremely high,25 while it is not the case for 
China.  
Prior to 2005, the compensation for each coalmining death in China was 
between 30,000 and 50,000 yuan, with a maximum compensation of 80,000 yuan 
(9,756 US dollars in 2005 exchange rate)
26
 and a maximum total fine of 150,000 yuan. 
In 2005, started from Shanxi province (the epicentre of coalmining accidents) and 
gradually followed by other provinces, the compensation level has been raised to 
200,000 yuan plus one million yuan fines for each coalmining death.  
Using 2005 data from China’s official Xinhua News Agency,27 the death toll per 
million ton of coals was at about 5 people and the raw profit for one million ton of 
coals produced was about 100 million yuan. Thus, the total compensation and fine for 
the 5 deaths was at 6 million yuan that was merely 6% of the raw profit. Between 
2001-2004, the majority period of our sample, using the maximum compensation of 
80,000 yuan and a total fine of 150,000 yuan per death, 5 deaths would cost the 
                                                          
25
 Take the U.S. for example. In April 5, 2010, a massive explosion happened at the Upper Big 
Branch coal mine in West Virginia which led to 29 miner deaths. Each family of the victims was 
offered case settlements for $3 million. The families were also entitled to receive other benefits 
including health insurance coverage, life insurance (five times the annual salary of the 
mineworker), college tuition, and ongoing weekly paychecks (until widows remarry). 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126397976.  
In terms of fines made by the government, a Massey Energy subsidiary was fined $2.5 million by 
a U.S. District Judge for a fire that killed two West Virginia coal miners on Jan. 19, 2006. 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2009/04/17/99728.htm. 
26
 The average exchange rate between U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan in 2005 was 1 dollar to 8.2 
yuan. 
27
 The Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency of China. It is subordinate to the State 
Council and reports to the Communist party’s Propaganda and Public Information Departments. 
Xinhua’s website is:http://www.news.cn/english/ 
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coalmining firm just over half million yuan, which is less than 1% of its raw profit. 
Thus, for Chinese coalmining firms, the reverse causality scenario mentioned above is 
less likely.  
 
3.5. Other endogeneity problems 
The other form of the endogeneity problem is an omitted variable bias. The concern is 
that some unobservable firm characteristics could be responsible for both the level of 
leverage in a firm and the number of fatalities. Next, we use the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression method to address this potential problem. We use the 
value-weighted debt ratio for all firms in a province as the instrumental variable (IV) 
for a firm’s debt ratio in that province.28 Our choice of the instrumental variable is 
based on two reasons: First, if a province has an average high level of leverage for its 
coalmining industry, it is likely that this overall high leverage will affect the leverage 
decisions of individual firms.
29
 Second, it is exogenous to the coalmining death for 
any particular firm.
30
  
Table 6 specifications 1 and 2 report the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regression results. The first stage results indicate that the provincial-level average debt 
ratio significantly affects the individual firm’s leverage, which is consistent with our 
earlier argument. The second stage results show that, consistent with the main 
evidence, the coefficient estimates of the debt ratio is positive and statistically 
significant though at the 10% significance level. 
                                                          
28
 In economic literature, it is common to use an average indicator of an area as the instrumental 
variable (IV) for firms in the area. For example, Dunifon, Hansen, Nicholson, Nielsen (2013) use 
local unemployment rate as the instrumental variable (IV) for mother’s unemployment in each 
family. 
29
 Note that this does not necessarily mean that if the average debt level in a province is high, then 
an individual coalmining firm in this province would have a high death level unless it affects the 
firm to adopt a high debt ratio which results in high fatalities. 
30
 The average debt ratio in a province does not directly affect a firm’s coalmining accident/death, 
while it may affect the firm’s leverage choice and hence indirectly affect the death toll. 
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[Table 6] 
Another concern is that this year’s coalmining fatality could be affected by the 
death toll of last year. To address this problem, we control for the number of death of 
last year and use the system GMM (generalized method of moments) regression 
method which is regarded as most suitable for examining dynamic panel data. The 
GMM strategy uses only internal instruments to cope with potential endogeneity of 
the debt ratio (Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Blundell and Bond, 1998).
31
 
Specification 3 shows the GMM regression results. Similar to other tests, the 
coefficient estimate of the debt ratio is positive and significant at the 5% level test. 
 
3.6. Poisson regression for count variable 
Our dependent variable, the number of coalmining death, is the annual total number 
of death for a coalmining firm. This variable is nonnegative and takes on relatively 
few values including zero, which is also known as the count variable. In our case, 
nearly 99% of the observations take the values of zero, one, and two.  
Wooldridge (2013) argue that a count variable will not have a normal 
distribution, since the normal distribution is for continuous variables that can take on 
a large range of values. Its distribution can be very different from normal if the 
variable takes on very few values. Given normality is the standard distributional 
assumption for liner regression, a linear model might, therefore, not be the best 
approach for our study.
32
 Since the nominal distribution for count data is the Poisson 
distribution, a Poisson regression model is probably more appropriate than a liner 
                                                          
31
 If we assume the debt ratio is endogenous and is correlated with the contemporaneous error 
term, we can use the second and further lagged debt ratios as instruments for the first-differenced 
equation, and use the lagged first-differenced debt ratios as instruments for the level equation. 
32
 Wooldridge (2013) argue that although a liner model for count data might not provide the best 
fit over all values of the explanatory variables, it is, nevertheless, always informative to start with 
a liner model. 
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model. In addition, the economic interpretation is straightforward under the Poisson 
regression, which helps us to assess the economic significance of our study. 
In Table 7 specification 1, we perform the Poisson regression under the original 
set of variable.  In specification 2, we run similar regression but use total sales as a 
proxy for size and ROA as a proxy for profitability. In both regressions, we control 
only for the year fixed effects, since controlling for firm fixed effects in Poisson 
regression can cause the losses of a large majority of observations in an unbalanced 
panel dataset such as ours. Results are statistically significant at the 1% level test for 
both regressions. The economic meaning is also straightforward. Specification 1, for 
example, suggests that a 10% increase in the debt ratio leads, on average, to a 3% 
increase in the number of death tolls.
33
  
 
4. Conclusion 
China’s coalmining fatalities were 140 times higher than the U.S. in the last decade. 
Studies in the past shed important light on the causes of such a high fatality rate, 
especially in the areas of regulatory environment and industrial characteristics. These 
studies, however, overlook the potentially important characteristics embedded within 
the coalmining firms, due largely to the unavailability of such a firm-level database. 
In this paper, we bridge this gap by hand-collecting and constructing a unique 
dataset for China’s coalmining firms and examining the firm’s internal characteristics 
that may contribute to the high death rate. We find that firm’s leverage, a neglected 
factor in the coalmining safety studies but a fundamental element in corporate finance, 
significantly determines the coalmining fatalities. We argue that, from a firm level 
                                                          
33
 In results unreported here, we run Poisson regression by controlling for both the year and firm 
fixed effects where, as a result, we lose 88% of the observations (we are left with only 2988 out of 
25,381 observations). Nonetheless, the coefficient estimate of debt ratio remains statistically 
significant at the 1% level test. 
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perspective, reducing leverage is a potentially effective tool in easing the number of 
coalmining accidents/deaths. Our study, therefore, highlights the importance of 
corporate finance in helping solving social and institutional problems.  
While we focus on China’s coalmining industry in this study, our intuition can 
be applied to the wide industries and perhaps other developing countries where the 
workplace safety is a top concern. Our study, thus, paves the way for more corporate 
finance based analyses in workplace accidents and fatalities.  
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Table 1: Coalmining accidents and employee fatalities 
This table presents the statistics on the annual distribution of China’s coalmining accidents and employee 
fatalities for the period 2001-2006. The data on coalmining accidents and fatalities are hand collected from 
the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) and the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety 
(SACMS). The SAWS and SACMS publish information on the date of the coalmining accident, the name 
of the firm involving an accident, and the number of death tolls for each accident. 
 
Year No. of firms No. of firms 
with accident 
No. of 
accidents 
No. of deaths Deaths per 
accident 
2001 2,549 83 117 265 2.3 
2002 2,686 180 290 484 1.7 
2003 3,058 245 407 863 2.1 
2004 5,157 275 416 714 1.7 
2005 5,606 290 405 625 1.5 
2006 6,463 82 90 316 3.5 
All 25,519 1,155 1,725 3,267 1.9 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
This table provides the coalmining firm-level and provincial-level data for the period 2001-2006. The firm-level data are obtained from the 
Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database (CIED), which is constructed by the National Bureau of Statistics and is the largest database for Chinese 
industrial firms. The CIED covers all state-owned and sizable non-state-owned enterprises, which accounts for 90% of the total sales of all 
industrial firms in China. For the provincial-level data: The GDP per capita for each province is collected from China Statistical Yearbook; the 
measure for the level of corruption for each province is recorded in China Procuratorial Yearbook; the number of total circulation of media 
newspapers is obtained from China Statistical Data of Press and Publication. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A.1. 
 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Stand 
deviation 
Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Panel A: Firm-level variables:         
Debt ratio 25,387 0.534 0.362 0 0.282 0.519 0.750 10.282 
Tax rate 25,387 0.095 0.060 0 0.054 0.090 0.126 0.862 
Subsidy rate 25,387 0.007 0.072 0 0 0 0 6.324 
Size (mil) 25,387 159.0 1,224 0.024 5.8 12 30.7 49,600 
Age 25,387 15.48 13.88 1 5 10 22 58 
Profitability rate 25,387 0.066 0.804 -102.5 0.007 0.064 0.154 0.884 
Investment in fixed asset 25,387 0.453 0.244 0 0.265 0.444 0.627 1 
State ownership 25,387 0.202 0.391 0 0 0 0 1 
Individual ownership 25,387 0.347 0.458 0 0 0 1 1 
Panel B: Provincial-level variables:         
GDP per capita (Yuan) 186 13,460 9,979 3,000 7,216 10,083 15,000 58,837 
Corruption 186 4.42 1.43 1.31 3.17 4.40 5.43 10.18 
Media exposure 186 22.70 19.22 4.65 10.95 15.70 23.99 92.25 
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Table 3: The determinants of coalmining fatality: Baseline regression analysis 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the determinants of coalmining fatality. The 
sample consists of 25,381 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of coalmining deaths per firm per year. 
All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table A.1. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the provincial level. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Burdens and benefits:    
Debt ratio 0.030*** 
(0.010) 
0.016** 
(0.047) 
0.016** 
(0.040) 
Tax rate  -0.050 
(0.168) 
-0.049 
(0.176) 
Subsidy rate  0.012 
(0.760) 
0.013 
(0.744) 
Firm characteristics:    
Size (log)  0.006* 
(0.085) 
0.006* 
(0.068) 
Age (log)  0.003 
(0.615) 
0.004 
(0.610) 
Profitability rate  0.004** 
(0.012) 
0.004** 
(0.016) 
Investment in fixed asset  0.009 
(0.353) 
0.009 
(0.353) 
    
Equity ownership:    
State ownership  0.017 
(0.334) 
0.017 
(0.322) 
Individual ownership  0.006 
(0.507) 
0.006 
(0.527) 
Provincial control variables:    
GDP per capita (log)  
 
0.025 
(0.799) 
Corruption  
 
0.006 
(0.481) 
Media exposure  
 
-0.0002 
(0.888) 
    
Intercept 0.033*** 
(0.003) 
-0.059 
(0.105) 
-0.302 
(0.731) 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 25,387 25,381 25,381 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.002 0.012 0.012 
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Table 4: The determinants of coalmining fatality: Subsample regressions 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the determinants of coalmining fatality for subsamples formed 
on whether a coalmining firm is a key-state firm or whether it has high than median debt ratio. The full sample 
consists of 25,381 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of (one plus) the number of coalmining deaths per firm per year. All explanatory variables are defined 
in Appendix Table A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Independent variables All 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
Key 
(3) 
Non-key 
(4) 
High-debt 
(5) 
Low-debt 
(6) 
Burdens and benefits:       
Debt ratio 0.016** 
(0.023) 
 0.049 
(0.749) 
0.016** 
(0.028) 
0.027** 
(0.033) 
-0.002 
(0.931) 
Debt ratio * key state firm 0.007 
(0.977) 
     
High debt ratio  
 
 0.010** 
(0.047) 
    
Tax rate -0.049 
(0.176) 
-0.049 
(0.180) 
-0.331 
(0.820) 
-0.042 
(0.249) 
-0.123* 
(0.058) 
0.031 
(0.528) 
Subsidy rate 0.013 
(0.739) 
0.013 
(0.742) 
1.520*** 
(0.001) 
-0.029 
(0.173) 
0.061 
(0.498) 
-0.074 
(0.133) 
Firm characteristics:       
Size (log) 0.006* 
(0.065) 
0.005 
(0.118) 
-0.077 
(0.489) 
0.006* 
(0.096) 
0.008 
(0.275) 
0.004 
(0.421) 
Age (log) 0.004 
(0.609) 
0.004 
(0.603) 
-0.030 
(0.469) 
0.004 
(0.543) 
0.012 
(0.256) 
0.002 
(0.797) 
Profitability rate 0.004** 
(0.016) 
0.004** 
(0.019) 
-0.213 
(0.405) 
0.004*** 
(0.006) 
0.010** 
(0.030) 
-0.0005 
(0.563) 
Investment in fixed assets 0.009 
(0.353) 
0.009 
(0.364) 
-0.019 
(0.958) 
0.008 
(0.424) 
0.018 
(0.336) 
0.001 
(0.945) 
Equity ownership:       
State ownership 0.016 
(0.320) 
0.017 
(0.322) 
0.087 
(0.331) 
0.012 
(0.449) 
0.015 
(0.455) 
0.009 
(0.671) 
Individual ownership 0.006 
(0.527) 
0.005 
(0.535) 
0.362 
(0.720) 
0.006 
(0.516) 
-0.003 
(0.784) 
0.009 
(0.480) 
Provincial control variables:     
GDP per capita (log) 0.025 
(0.797) 
0.022 
(0.823) 
0.802 
(0.265) 
0.035 
(0.743) 
-0.095 
(0.531) 
0.097 
(0.583) 
Corruption 0.006 
(0.481) 
0.006 
(0.485) 
0.104* 
(0.055) 
0.001 
(0.843) 
0.006 
(0.625) 
0.001 
(0.860) 
Media exposure -0.0002 
(0.888) 
-0.0001 
(0.913) 
0.004 
(0.524) 
-0.0003 
(0.763) 
0.00002 
(0.990) 
-0.001 
(0.502) 
       
Intercept -0.303 
(0.728) 
-0.268 
(0.762) 
-6.275 
(0.295) 
-0.358 
(0.703) 
0.702 
(0.607) 
-0.875 
(0.562) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 25,381 25,381 478 24,903 12,279 13,102 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.012 0.012 0.161 0.010 0.014 0.012 
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Table 5: The determinants of coalmining fatality: Alternative variables 
This table presents the OLS regression results on the robustness of the determinants of coalmining fatality 
by using alternative explanatory and dependent variables. The sample consists of 25,381 firm-year 
observations for the period 2001-2006. The dependent variable for specifications 1 and 2 is the natural 
logarithm of (one plus) the number of coalmining deaths per firm per year. The dependent variables for 
specifications 3 to 5 is a dummy variable ‘Death3’ which equals one if a coalmining accident involving 
three or more deaths and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table A.1. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
 Death (log) 
(1) 
Death3 
(2) 
Death3 
(3) 
Burdens and benefits:    
Debt ratio 0.015* 
(0.071) 
0.007** 
(0.031) 
0.006** 
(0.046) 
Tax rate -0.042 
(0.265) 
-0.029** 
(0.043) 
-0.026* 
(0.086) 
Subsidy rate 0.011 
(0.792) 
0.025 
(0.282) 
0.024 
(0.313) 
Firm characteristics:    
Size – total asset (log)  0.002 
(0.134) 
 
Size – total sales (log) -0.001 
(0.667) 
 -0.001 
(0.697) 
Age (log) 0.004 
(0.584) 
-6.40e-06 
(0.998) 
0.0001 
(0.978) 
Profitability rate  0.002** 
(0.030) 
 
Return on asset (ROA) -0.002 
(0.526) 
 -0.001** 
(0.331) 
Investment in fixed asset 0.005 
(0.567) 
0.002 
(0.697) 
0.0004 
(0.912) 
Equity ownership:    
State ownership 0.018 
(0.301) 
-0.0004 
(0.961) 
-0.0001 
(0.991) 
Individual ownership 0.006 
(0.528) 
0.004 
(0.119) 
0.004 
(0.121) 
Provincial control variables:    
GDP per capita (log) 0.038 
(0.706) 
0.002 
(0.964) 
0.006 
(0.876) 
Corruption 0.006 
(0.484) 
-0.0002 
(0.934) 
-0.0002 
(0.954) 
Media exposure -0.0001 
(0.907) 
0.0004 
(0.451) 
0.0004 
(0.432) 
    
Intercept -0.346 
(0.695) 
-0.036 
(0.918) 
-0.053 
(0.881) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 25,381 25,381 25,381 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.012 0.004 0.004 
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Table 6: The determinants of coalmining fatality: Robustness on endogeneity 
This table presents the regression results on the robustness of the determinants of coalmining fatality 
by performing the two-stage least square (2SLS) and the generalized method of moments(GMM) 
regressions to control for endogeneity. The sample consists of 25,381 firm-year observations for the 
period 2001-2006. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of 
coalmining deaths per firm per year. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table A.1. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Independent variables 2SLS  GMM 
 First stage Second stage  
Burdens and benefits:    
Province average debt ratio 0.321*** 
(<0.001) 
  
No. of death last year (log)   0.031*** 
(<0.001) 
Debt ratio  0.264* 
(0.090) 
0.017** 
(0.032) 
Tax rate -0.163*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.010 
(0.850) 
-0.027 
(0.352) 
Subsidy rate 0.045 
(0.172) 
0. 0004 
(0.992) 
0.059 
(0.047) 
Firm characteristics:    
Size (log) -0.040*** 
(<0.001) 
0.016** 
(0.039) 
-0.001 
(0.617) 
Age (log) 0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.891) 
0.002 
(0.641) 
Profitability rate -0.004* 
(0.086) 
0.005* 
(0.061) 
0.0003 
(0.358) 
Investment in fixed asset -0.111*** 
(<0.001) 
0.037* 
(0.085) 
0.014 
(0.128) 
Equity ownership:    
State ownership 0.023* 
(0.051) 
0.011 
(0.390) 
0.060*** 
(<0.001) 
Individual ownership -0.014** 
(0.046) 
0.009 
(0.241) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Provincial control variables: 
GDP per capita (log) -0.275*** 
(<0.001) 
0.104 
(0.290) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
Corruption -0.001 
(0.679) 
0.007* 
(0.066) 
0.009*** 
(<0.001) 
Media exposure 0.0002 
(0.761) 
-0.0002 
(0.803) 
-0.002*** 
(0.004) 
    
Intercept 3.131*** 
(<0.001) 
-1.217 
(0.190) 
-0.215** 
(0.018) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 25,381 25,381 15,020 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.021 0.010  
AR(2)   0.504 
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Table 7: The determinants of coalmining fatality: Robustness on Poisson regression 
This table presents the Poisson regression results on the robustness of the determinants of 
coalmining fatality. The sample consists of 25,381 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of coalmining deaths per 
firm per year. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table A.1. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Independent variable Poisson 
(1) 
Poisson 
(2) 
Burdens and benefits:   
Debt ratio 0.301*** 
(0.005) 
0.226*** 
(0.005) 
Tax rate -4.807*** 
(0.002) 
-3.948*** 
(0.008) 
Subsidy rate 0.348 
(0.064) 
0.465*** 
(0.004) 
Firm characteristics:   
Size (log) 0.340*** 
(<0.001) 
 
Sales (log)  0.360*** 
(<0.001) 
Age (log) 0.375*** 
(<0.001) 
0.403*** 
(<0.001) 
Profitability rate -0.009 
(0.422) 
 
Return on asset (ROA)  -0.436 
(0.121) 
Investment in fixed asset 0.540*** 
(0.001) 
0.557*** 
(0.001) 
   
Equity ownership:   
State ownership 0.632*** 
(0.007) 
0.869*** 
(<0.001) 
Individual ownership 0.399** 
(0.044) 
0.346* 
(0.084) 
Provincial control variables:   
GDP per capita (log) -0.192 
(0.742) 
-0.210 
(0.717) 
Corruption 0.122 
(0.429) 
0.085 
(0.579) 
Media exposure -0.002 
(0.943) 
-0.003 
(0.897) 
   
Intercept -6.508 
(0.190) 
-6.136 
(0.222) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 25,381 25,381 
Log pseudo likelihood  -11170.581 -11258.239 
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Appendix Table A.1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Coalmining death The natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of coalmining deaths 
per firm per year. 
Death3 A dummy variable equals one if a coalmining accident involving 
three or more deaths and zero otherwise. 
Debt ratio A firm’s total debt divided by its total asset. 
Tax rate The annual total amount of taxes paid by a firm divided by its total 
sales. 
Subsidy rate The annual total amount of government subsidies received by a firm 
divided by its total sales. 
Size (log) The natural logarithm of a firm’s total asset. 
Sales (log) The natural logarithm of a firm’s total sales. 
Age (log) The natural logarithm of the number of years since the formation of 
the firm. 
Profitability rate A firm’s operating profit divided by its total sales. 
Return on asset (ROA) A firm’s operating profits divided by its total assets. 
Investment in fixed asset A firm’s total investment in fixed asset divided by its total asset. 
State ownership The percentage equity ownership by the state. 
Individual ownership The percentage total equity ownership by the collective individual 
investors. 
GDP per capita (log) The natural logarithm of average GDP per capita for each province. 
Corruption It is measured as the corruption cases filed per 10,000 government 
officials for each province. 
Media exposure It is measured as the per capita print of newspapers in a year for each 
province. 
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Appendix Table A.2: Pearson correlation matrix 
This table presents the pair-wise correlations for the key variables. P-values are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix Table A.1. 
 
 Death Debt ratio Tax rate Subsidy 
rate 
Size Age Profit rate Inv. in 
fixed asset 
State 
ownership 
Debt ratio 0.027*** 
(<0.001) 
        
Tax rate -0.013** 
(0.040) 
-0.008 
(0.236) 
       
Subsidy rate 0.041*** 
(<0.001) 
0.071*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.024*** 
(<0.001) 
      
Size 0.131*** 
(<0.001) 
0.023*** 
(<0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.015** 
(0.016) 
     
Age 0.098*** 
(<0.001) 
0.166*** 
(<0.001) 
0.087*** 
(<0.001) 
0.126*** 
(<0.001) 
0.153*** 
(<0.001) 
    
Profitability rate -0.010 
(0.119) 
-0.057*** 
(<0.001) 
0.077*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.120*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.861) 
-0.045*** 
(<0.001) 
   
Investment in 
fixed asset 
0.013** 
(0.037) 
-0.202*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.119*** 
(<0.001) 
0.009*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.009) 
-0.052*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
  
State ownership 0.089*** 
(<0.001) 
0.204*** 
(<0.001) 
0.041*** 
(<0.001) 
0.135*** 
(<0.001) 
0.164*** 
(<0.001) 
0.476*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.071*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.010* 
(0.100) 
 
Individual 
ownership 
-0.031*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.134*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.097*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.054*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.082*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.299*** 
(<0.001) 
0.016*** 
(0.009) 
0.048*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.374*** 
(<0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
